MLB Notebook: Where it all went wrong for the 2019 Red Sox

Technically speaking, the Red Sox haven't been eliminated from playoff contention. And so, they soldier on, hoping against slim hope that the many teams in front of them will collapse, offering them a tiny window to the wild card.

They can fight the good fight, but deep down, even they know it's not happening.

Where did it go wrong? The eight-game losing streak in late July and early August? The 2-8 start on the first road trip? Yes and yes, and a handful of other lost opportunities, too.

But those are specific stretches of play or groups of game.

Ultimately, the Red Sox are going to miss out on qualifying for the playoffs for the same reason every other team falls short: the players didn't perform well enough. Some were injured. Some seemed to get old in a hurry. Others merely had off-years.

If players don't perform, no amount of wizardry on the part of the manager, coaching staff or front office is going to overcome that.

But part of the responsibilities of a manager and GM are to put those same players in a position to succeed, and for the 2019 Red Sox, there were too many instances of operator error at the top.

In that sense, the real downfall came from poor decision-making and philosophical slip-ups.

So, a deeper dive into the choices that sent the season off the tracks is in order, ranked in order of importance. (For the time being, we'll table contractual decisions since, say, extending Chris Sale past this season didn't contribute to his poor season).

1. The "Take it Easy'' approach in spring training.

In order to preserve and protect their veteran starters, who had heavy workloads the previous October, the team devised a plan to bring its rotation along slowly during the Grapefruit League season. Starters would do their throwing in less stressful environments -- on the backfields; in a simulated game; against minor league teams -- and, in theory, expend less effort and energy in March, the better to be at maximum strength in September and October.

Oops.

Instead, what happened was the team punted on the first month of the season, putting itself such a poor position to start the year that it took until late May before the Red Sox managed to get themselves back to the .500 level. (In the meantime, the Yankees, saddled with injuries, got off to a steaking start and effectively sewed up the division by the All-Star break, leaving the wild card spots as the Sox' only realistic target).

To his credit, Dave Dombrowski acknowledged last month that the organization erred in its approach and said the organization needs to find a better way to prepare its pitchers for the season. Alex Cora, however, has been less willing to concede the error, noting recently that veteran Charlie Morton has had a fantastic season for Tampa Bay despite throwing just 10 innings in Grapefruit League games.

That suggests that Cora isn't quite willing to concede the error of his ways. But there can be little doubt that the team's poor start, the rotation's underperformance and ultimately, the fact that the two most important starters are sidelined in September with physical ailments is evidence enough of what a failure the policy was.

2. Not adding to the bullpen in the offseason.

By now, this is obvious. In fact, it was obvious in spring training that it would be an issue.

No one was suggesting that the Sox should have re-signed both Joe Kelly and Craig Kimbrel. Indeed, Kelly has been every bit as inconsistent with the Dodgers (4.56 ERA) as he was last year with the Red Sox and there were plenty of reasons to be dissuaded from bringing back a closer in his 30s with signs of decline.

Fine.

But to think that the Sox didn't need to somehow replace the 128 innings they provided last season was folly.

There was further naivete in the thinking that the Sox, having uncovered an unheralded gem in Ryan Brasier in 2018, could do it again with someone else this season. (In point of fact, Brasier himself hasn't been anywhere near the pitcher he was last year, a reminder of how fickle reliever performance can be.).

The Sox didn't need to overspend on Andrew Miller or Zack Britton to fill that need. There were other relievers with high-leverage capabilities who could have added to their back-end depth.

Instead, the Sox displayed some institutional arrogance and determined that they would, you know, figure it out. But they didn't.

3. Not naming a closer.

For much of the spring, Cora coyly deflected questions about who the closer would be, repeatedly telling reporters that it would become obvious in the late innings of the first game in Seattle.

Except that wasn't the case.

Yes, Matt Barnes had been identified by Cora and pitching coach Dana LeVangie as the team's primary choice for high-leverage spots. But that was part of a plan to use Barnes in the toughest situations -- whether they come in the seventh, eighth or ninth -- and not necessarily in save situations.

So, for the first four months or so, the Sox were without a designated closer. A handful of different relievers got the ball in the ninth, depending on usage, availability and matchups.

The result? Relievers were unsure of their roles and unsure when or how they would be used. In the meantime, Barnes lost confidence after, predictably, being beaten up by the toughest parts of the opponents' lineup night after night.

I've long believed that the bullpen-by-committee -- for lack of a better term -- can be successful and that baseball has for too long put too much emphasis on having the best reliever pitch in save situations, regardless of opponent or where teams are in their order.

But there has to be a buy-in from the bullpen. There has to be some semblance of order to the arrangement, for too long in the season, there was none for the Red Sox.

Eventually, the Sox settled on Brandon Workman as a more traditional closing option. It can't be entirely coincidental that since July 24, the Sox have the lowest bullpen ERA in the game. That roughly coincides with Workman's appointment to the closer's role.

Would choosing Workman as the closer from the beginning made a difference? Maybe, maybe not. But given the struggles the Red Sox had with their rotation, they could have used some stability in the bullpen. If a handful of the blown saves don't happen in the first three months, who knows how that would alter the season?

4. Flip-flopping Mookie Betts and Andrew Benintendi in the lineup.

At the winter meetings last December, Cora announced that he intended to drop Betts to second in the batting order and elevate Benintendi to leadoff.

His reasoning at the time seemed sound: because of the lack of production at the bottom of the lineup in 2018, Betts too often came to the plate with the bases empty, thus depriving one of the team's two best hitters to have more run-producing plate appearances.

Add in Benintendi's ability to consistently reach base, and there was logic to the decision.

But right from the beginning, the new lineup didn't click. Benintendi never seemed to know what was expected of him at the top spot. Should he be aggressive and swing early in the count? Or should be patient, make sure that he didn't chase pitches out of the zone and be content with walks.

Similarly, Betts seemed to be stuck in some netherworld in the second spot. And his placement in the lineup took away a lot of opportunities for him to steal bases.

Finally, Cora recognized the error of his ways at the end of May, putting Betts back in the leadoff position. Within a month, Betts was back to being the force that he was a year ago. But also by then, half the season had gone without the Sox getting full value from their most dynamic player.

5. Mishandling the catching situation.

It happened so long ago it's hard to believe it was this season, but the Red Sox made the judgment at the end of spring training that Blake Swihart was capable of being part of a two-man catching situation while sending Sandy Leon to the minor leagues.

Then, as if to compound things, after the Sox designated Swihart for assignment and dealt him to Arizona, they had Leon and Christian Vazquez share the catching role. That, in retrospect, proved short-sighted, too.

It's true that Vazquez has been inconsistent behind the plate at times, allowing more wild pitches and guilty of more passed balls than he should. But he has the second-best caught-stealing numbers of any catcher in the league and he's enjoyed a breakout season at the plate, easily surpassing his previous career highs in homers and RBI and other categories.

Leon, on the other hand, continues to be completely overmatched at the plate, with a slash line of .181/.241/.295 which reads like the stats for your typical National League pitcher. A .295 OPS?

Again, this missed call ranks well behind the first three on this list, and is a good measure down from the fourth, too.

But it stands as yet one more example of the poor decision-making that has dogged this team literally from the start of spring training and lasted until the All-Star break.