McAdam: Even when it backfires, the Red Sox' usage of Matt Barnes is the right way to go

When Michael Chavis singled home Xander Bogaerts in the bottom of the 10th inning Wednesday night, giving the Red Sox a 6-5 walk-off win over the Colorado Rockies, the dramatic nature of the win obscured what had happened three innings earlier.

Lost somewhat amid the celebration was the decision by Alex Cora to go to Matt Barnes in the top of the seventh inning.

It marked the fourth time this season that Cora had inserted Barnes into a game in the seventh, but the first time since April 12, more than a month ago.

More tellingly, it was the most obvious example of Cora subscribing to the "high leverage'' approach when it comes to his relievers. Since the first few days of the season, Cora has used Barnes as his most reliable late-inning reliever and saved him for the most precarious spots.



For instance, if the Red Sox are leading by a run or three in the eighth inning and the opposition has, say, it's third, fourth and fifth hitters due in the eighth, Cora will most often call on Barnes for the eighth, while keeping Ryan Brasier back for the ninth.

In such a case, Braiser will get the save, but Barnes will have actually gotten the game's three toughest outs since he's facing the middle of a lineup while, under the circumstances noted above, Brasier will face the bottom half of the order.

On Wednesday night, however, Cora took things a step further.

Starter Eduardo Rodriguez began the seventh inning with a 5-2 lead, but quickly allowed a single, double and a hit batsman to load the bases for the Rockies with no outs. The game was on the line, so wisely, Cora didn't hold back his most effective relievers until after the storm passed -- he went to him for the most critical juncture.

That Barnes failed to strand any of the three baserunners he inherited -- a single to left by Colorado shortstop Trevor Story scored two runs and, one out later, a grounder to second, bobbled by Chavis enough to wipe out a chance for an inning-ending double play, scored the tying run -- is almost secondary.

First Barnes was probably not at his best after pitching two perfect innings the night before, fanning five of the six hitters he faced.

Secondly, just because a move doesn't work doesn't mean it wasn't the right call. Often, the wrong results can obscure the proper decision.

But given that the Red Sox are committed to utilizing their bullpen in a somewhat unconventional manner, Cora -- and by extension, Barnes -- was simply the victim of randomness of outcomes. If the notion behind the plan is to have your best reliever on the mound when the game's on the line -- and not habitually assigned to the ninth inning with a three-run lead, as has been customary for the past few decades for no logical reason -- than Cora was correct in his call.

Not only is Barnes the most experience of the options in the back end of the Red Sox bullpen, he's also the most dominant. Before Wednesday's appearance, Barnes had struck out exactly half (33-of-66) of the hitters he'd faced this season, and with the bases loaded and no out, a strikeout or two would have frozen the baserunners.

"That late in the game,'' noted Cora, "you don't want contact.''

Barnes has bought into the philosophy, acknowledging that, given the evolution of today's game, his goal is to strike out every hitter. That he's done so at a higher rate than any other reliever in the game this season is evidence that his approach has been successful.

The question, then, isn't why the Red Sox had their best reliever in a game with nine outs still to go. The more pertinent question is why other teams aren't adopting the same tactic.

For all the innovation that's taken place, for all the willingness to experiment and strike back against outmoded strategy, too many teams still approach their bullpen usage like it's 1992.

The fact that the Red Sox had things backfire -- temporarily, of course, since they eventually won the game -- shouldn't alter the fact that they're on the right track. Even under more conventional bullpen setups, blown saves happen and leads get squandered.

When such mishaps are occasional and to be expected at least every great once in a while, the closer gets the ball again the next night under the exact same scenario.

It should be the same with Barnes and his usage: the best bet would be for the Red Sox to utilize him exactly as they have, knowing that far more often than not, the outcome will turn out better than it did Wednesday.