It's not a fun reality. The fact that money dictates so many choices in today's NBA is a brutal pill to swallow. Basketball should drive every roster-building decision. That's simply not the case.
You don't have to look further than this summer. The Oklahoma City Thunder traded Lu Dort, Isaiah Joe, and Aaron Wiggins in three separate moves, all of which were pure salary dumps.
The New York Knicks are pressed up against the second apron, so they didn't re-sign Mitchell Robinson. The Minnesota Timberwolves, as small a move as it was, traded Josh Green to the Utah Jazz for Cody Williams and John Konchar to get back under the second apron after signing Jonathan Kuminga.
Money runs the league, but not for the reason most perceive. Where most see cheap ownership groups forcing front offices to avoid major luxury tax penalties, a different issue lies beneath the surface.
Sitting in the second apron means dealing with significant roster-building penalties. Here they are, as broken down by Spotrac and organized by where a team sits in regard to the salary cap:

Spotrac
Salary cap and apron penalties
If the Boston Celtics were an apron team (first or second), they couldn't have signed Mitchell Robinson this summer. He signed on board using the non-taxpayer mid-level exception (NTMLE).
First-apron teams cannot complete sign-and-trades. They cannot use the bi-annual exception (BAE). They cannot use TPEs, sign expensive buyout players, or get back more than they send out in a trade.
At the second apron, the rules get worse. Second-apron teams cannot aggregate players in trades. That means they cannot combine two salaries to match a larger salary in return.
They also cannot send out cash, sign players for anything more than a minimum contract, or use any of the MLE. That makes roster adjustment nearly impossible. At least, at a significant enough level to make real changes.
And that's without even considering the actual finances. Because while ownership is not often the primary reason teams don't want to go over the second apron, it certainly plays a part.
James Dolan recently noted that he is unwilling to dip into the second apron. The Denver Nuggets have been avoiding the aprons for years. Plenty of teams are cheap, and when a team dips into the luxury tax for too long, things get very expensive.
Here are some numbers from The CBA Guide that show exactly how brutal taxes can be if a team refuses to dip below the luxury tax in three of four straight seasons:

THE CBA GUIDE
Tax threshold explanation

THE CBA GUIDE
Repeater penalties explanation

THE CBA GUIDE
List of NBA tax rates

The CBA Guide
NBA tax brackets
A lot of numbers. And to be clear, the tax brackets are based on 2025-26, while the tax rates are based on 2026-27. So, there are some slight discrepancies in the numbers. You can find the full website here.
It's a lot of information to take in, but the key is the three-out-of-four seasons rule. If a team paid the luxury tax in three of the past four campaigns, it's subject to the repeater tax.
The repeater tax makes some huge jumps. You can see the difference between the first bracket and the second and onward. A $30 million contract can quickly cost over $200 million if a team isn't careful.
And again, ownership can be cheap. But at that point, if a team isn't winning championship after championship -- which hasn't happened in nearly a decade, well before the current CBA -- then paying that much over and over again is a fruitless endeavor.
So, what does all this mean for the Celtics? How does it connect to the Jaylen Brown trade? What are they doing to set themselves up for the future?
Brad Stevens alluded to it at his post-trade press conference: The cap. The Celtics didn't want two players taking up 70% of the cap, which Jayson Tatum and Brown were slated to do:
"I might be wrong. I’m not going to stand up here and be defensive about that, but the path looked a little bit more challenging with 70% of our cap and such a high percent of our usage tied into two players," Stevens said. "And the reality in this era and in this day and age at the NBA, you could see it obviously, with the last couple of champions and some of the teams that were at the very top of the league, when it was all said and done at the end of this year, is that you have to do a great job and you have to have the optionality to do a great job of building out depth that can hopefully replace the irreplaceable individual."
Now, before we get into the actual money, there are some underlying messages to uncover. As well as a reality that's staring the Celtics in the face: They still have two players taking up 70% of the cap.
Paul George makes nearly as much as Brown. He and Tatum are taking up around 68% of the cap for the next two seasons. So, in the short-term, nothing has changed.
But also consider this. The "usage" portion of that response. Stevens and the Celtics didn't want so much usage tied up into two players. Then, why were they in the market for Giannis Antetokounmpo?
Based on that reported interest and the way the Brown trade unfolded, it's clear that
