The Celtics have gone all-in on Mazzulla Ball

It's been a contentious summer in the Boston Celtics world. Major changes were made. Jaylen Brown is a Philadelphia 76er. LeBron James joined him shortly after, rubbing salt in the wound.

And all of that came just months after the Celtics blew a 3-1 lead to those same Sixers. Needless to say, the organization's future was called into question. Yet, in reality, Boston's plan is simple.

All the stats, projections, and numbers in the world cannot erase the sting of trading a guy like Brown. But when you take a step back and push emotions aside for a moment, it becomes clear: The Celtics are diving head-first into Mazzulla Ball.

For some, that may sound like a nightmare. A barrage of 3-point shots chucked from five feet behind the arc with Joe Mazzulla grinning like The Joker on the sideline. That's the reputation Mazzulla Ball has garnered over the past few years.

However, while an affinity for the 3-ball and analytically sound basketball has remained, Mazzulla has adjusted how he's played a lot based on his roster. The 2024 Championship Celtics played much differently than the 2026 squad, stripped down by the second apron.

Boston cannot repeat its 2024 style because building a team with that array of talent is no longer possible under the current CBA. It's too expensive. So, instead, Boston seems to be trying to form an upgraded version of last year's team. One that doubles down on everything that worked, while cutting out some of the things that didn't.

In 2024, the Celtics' offense was very iso-heavy. Jayson Tatum and Brown picking on mismatches, kicking out to open shooters. The Celtics wanted to capitalize on their talent advantage as much as possible. Jrue Holiday and Kristaps Porzingis post-ups. Holiday and Al Horford in the corner. Porzingis pick-and-pop threes.

Defensively, it was similar. The Celtics didn't send much help. They lived with one-on-one matchups because they trusted their defensive personnel. They didn't want to take risks because they felt they had an inherent advantage on defense, so doing so would only give opponents more room to succeed.

Last year, Boston didn't have those luxuries. The Celtics' massive payroll was slashed, forcing young players and unproven guys into larger roles. So, Mazzulla and his staff adjusted accordingly.

On offense, they set a ton of screens. Neemias Queta and Luka Garza flew around like madmen trying to help create space. Offensive rebounding became a major focus because Boston had guys who could crash the boards. And perhaps most importantly, the Celtics were very stingy with the basketball. Turnovers were the enemy.

Meanwhile, on defense, the Celtics took more risks. Without the Holiday, Horford, Porzingis, and Luke Kornet-led foundation, they had to get creative. Mazzulla encouraged his guys to try to force more turnovers, helping over in spots where they may not have in years past.

That's Mazzulla Ball. That's the style the 2026-27 Celtics are going to try to replicate. The 2024 Celtics are gone. A thing of the past. The 2026 Celtics set the blueprint. And now, the 2027 Celtics are trying to maximize said blueprint.

Brown is one of the best basketball players in the world. An elite bucket-getter and impressive point-of-attack defender when he locks in, his skills are perfectly built to be at the forefront of a highly competitive basketball team.

Last year, that's what the Celtics needed. With Tatum sidelined, they needed a guy who could spearhead the offense. A guy who could put the ball in the basket and create space for others.

But at his core, Brown is not a Mazzulla Ball player. Because most of the major goals of Mazzulla Ball are not strengths in Brown's game. They're weaknesses.

Trading Brown was partially salary-related. Boston probably didn't want to extend him. But with Tatum back in full force, the Celtics are already going to have a high-usage guy. Having two could work if both were turnover-conscious, possession-additive, elite offensive creators. Brown does not check those boxes. Thus, the full-on shift into Mazzulla Ball.

Databallr is a great website for tracking various advanced stats. Though they aren't the end-all, be-all, when paired with actual statistics, they paint a pretty clear image.

For the sake of a fuller picture, let's look at some crucial Mazzulla-Ball stats from the past two years (since Tatum missed most of this past season, and not including Brown's opportunity to play with the elite spacing of Holiday, Porzingis, and Horford would be disingenuous).

Turnovers are the name of the game. On one end, not turning it over, and on the other, forcing them. It's a core principle of Mazzulla Ball.

Tatum and Brown rank fairly similarly when it comes to creating turnovers. Per Databaller's own stats (which account for more than just steals recorded by NBA.com), both have averaged 1.6 takeaways per game for the last two years. Tatum has a stop percentage of 2.1%, while Brown is at 2.0%. (Stop percentage, per Databallr, "totals the plays that most clearly end possessions for the defense: steals, offensive fouls drawn, and blocks that the defense recovers. It is a high-level finish-the-possession stat.")

The same can be said for their rFTOV (relative forced turnovers per 100 possessions), which is just how many turnovers they force per 100 possessions compared to league average. Tatum is at -0.3, Brown at -0.2. By the raw counting stats, Tatum has averaged 1.6 stocks (steals + blocks) for the last two years, and Brown has averaged 1.4.

But the other end is where Tatum separates himself. Tatum's 2.8 turnovers per game are better than Brown's 3.1, and considering Brown's number jumped to 3.6 when played in a higher-usage role, it's a fairly large gap.

The real difference comes in non-passing turnovers, however. Turnovers committed not in the act of passing (i.e., bad-pass turnovers, stolen-pass turnovers, etc.). Here is the stat, once again, as defined by Databallr:

"sTOV%: Non-passing turnovers as a share of scoring attempts. sTOV% isolates turnovers from scoring actions — travels, offensive fouls, lost handles — as opposed to bad passes. It measures how often a player gives the ball away while trying to score."

Over the last two years, Tatum's sTOV% is 6.5%, which ranks in the 44th percentile in the NBA. Not great. For comparison, Shai Gilgeous-Alexander's 4.4% is in the 92nd percentile. As for Brown, he's at 9.4%. That's in the ninth percentile. Brown turns the ball over a lot in bad spots.

For Mazzulla Ball, that's a nightmare. It's not necessarily about creating as many possessions as possible. Boston ranked dead last in total possessions last season by a mile. But rather, it's about controlling possessions. Having more than the opponent. The Celtics did a great job of that, and coughing up the ball in bad spots is counterintuitive.

So, where does the revamp come into play? Tatum being healthy and Brown being gone isn't enough of a change to actually maximize Mazzulla-Ball, possession-maxxing style. Correct. Enter Paul George and Mitchell Robinson.

George is not Brown. He never will be. But when it comes to maximizing the Mazzulla-Ball requirements? He's elite. 

First off, let's start on the offensive end. Over the last two years, George has a sTOV% of 6.4%. Nearly the same as Tatum's. His passing turnover percentage is at 14.7%, which is a bit steep, but overall, he takes care of the ball well.

Plus, though possessions are the focus, 3-point shooting matters. And with the ball in Tatum's hands so often, having elite floor-spacing around him will be crucial. George provides that.

He's shot 37.5% from deep range over the last two years. Last year, he was one of the best catch-and-shoot 3-point guys in the NBA. Among the 271 players who attempted at least 100 catch-and-shoot threes last year, George ranked 41st. He shot 41.7% on 168 attempts in 37 games. Brown shot 33.1% on 181 attempts in 71 games. For context, Payton Pritchard shot 41.6%.

But the biggest advocate for George's seamless fit into Mazzulla Ball lies on the defensive end. Despite being 36 years old, he's still been a very impactful defensive player, especially when it comes to